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Notes
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMs ACT-SERVICEMEN NOT EXCLUDED--Two
army enlisted men on furlough were riding with a civilian in
a privately owned automobile on a public highway when the
vehicle was struck by a United States Army truck negligently
driven by an employee of the United States Government. The
soldiers and civilian brought suit under the Federal Tort Claims
Act." Relying on Jefferson v. United States,2 the court of ap-
peals,3 by a two to one decision, denied the claims of the soldiers,
but granted recovery to the civilian. Certiorari was granted in
order that the United States Supreme Court might rule upon
whether the Federal Tort Claims Act should be interpreted to
include claims by members of the armed forces for torts not
service connected. Held, a member of the armed forces can re-
cover under the Federal Tort Claims Act for non-service con-
nected injuries caused by the negligent conduct of a government
employee. Brooks v. United States, 69 S.Ct. 918 (U.S. 1949).
The Federal Tort Claims Act was enacted as Title IV of
the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. The purpose of this
act was "To provide for increased efficiency in the legislative
branch of the government." The title dealing with tort claims
was designed to promote efficiency in government by eliminating
the many private bills introduced in Congess each year to author-
ize the granting of relief for tortious acts of government em-
ployees and agents. The act thus waived the sovereign im-
munity of the United States from torts suits and even went so
far as to forbid the introduction of private bills authorizing
claims falling within the ambit of the act. 4 Jurisdiction is con-
ferred on the United States district courts and liability is to be
tested "in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred."5
1. 60 Stat. 842 (1946), 28 U.S.C. § 921, now 28 U.S.C. § 2671(1948).
2. 77 F. Supp. 706 (App. D.C. 1948).
3. United States v. Brooks, 169 F.(2d) 840 (C.C.A. 4th, 1948).
4. 60 Stat. 831, Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, § 131.
5. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, § 410(a) reads as follows:
"Sec. 410. (a) Subject to the provisions of this title, the United States
district court for the district wherein the plaintiff is resident or wherein
the act or omission complained of occurred, Including the United States
district courts for the Territories and possessions of the United States, sit-
ting without a jury, shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear, determine,
and render judgment on any claim against the United States, for money
only, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, on account of damage to or
loss of property or on account of personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government
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In Jefferson v. United States it was held that a soldier could
not recover under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries sus-
tained as a result of the negligence of an army surgeon operating
in an army hospital. The United States Supreme Court distin-
guished the Jefferson case and held that service connected in-
juries to service personnel are exempt from the coverage of the
act, but that non-service connected injuries are included within
its scope. The case turned not so much on technical points of
interpretation as on the common sense notion that a soldier on
furlough is in a status not essentially different from that of a
civilian. Mr. Justice Murphy, speaking for the court, stated:
"But here we are dealing with an accident which had nothing
to do with the Brooks' Army careers, injuries not caused by
their service except in the sense that all human events depend
upon what has already transpired. Were the accident incident
to the Brooks' service, a wholly different case would be pre-
sented."6 Clearly the Supreme Court was not overruling the
Jefferson case but merely distinguishing it on its facts.
The point was much labored in the Brooks case that the
soldier, upon enlistment, acquires a special and unique military
status and that he becomes the object of the government's
benevolence in the form of low insurance rates and special and
automatic compensation for injury, incapacity, or death. From
this it was argued that because of these provisions the soldier
was already provided for (which supported other arguments of
statutory interpretation), and thus to allow recovery under the
Tort Claims Act would require the government to compensate
servicemen twice. Clearly this is not so, for, although holding
the petitioner's actions to be well founded, the Court remanded
the cases to the court of appeals to consider reduction of the
damages pro tanto for any claims which might have been pre-
viously paid for the same injuries under authorizations of law.
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while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circum-
stances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant for such damage, loss, injury, or death in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or omission occurred. Subject to the provi-
sions of this title, the United States shall be liable in respect of such claims
to the same claimants, in the same manner, and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances. . ..
"(b) The judgment in such an action shall constitute a complete bar
to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against
the employee of the Government whose act or omission gave rise to the
claim."
6. 69 S.Ct. 918, 920 (U.S. 1949).
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